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A Specter is Haunting America  
Bernie Sanders and Socialism in 2016  
ABSTRACT  
How did socialism come to be an increasingly legitimate political option in the United States? 
Why did Bernie Sanders emerge as a serious candidate for the 2016 Democratic presidential 
nomination, but ultimately fail to become the nominee? This analysis incorporates a cyclical 
theory of the presidency and evaluates pertinent changes in American political cultural opinions, 
social attitudes and economic trends, using historic data and 2016 election-cycle opinion polls 
and statistics. Increased receptiveness toward socialism and Bernie Sanders in 2016 occured due 
to the convergence of widespread economic hardship and discontent, and a desire for 
nontraditional political alternatives. There was not an overt increase in support for socialism. 
Similarly, standard electoral factors, and Sanders’ pursuit of a style of presidential authority and 
leadership that was ill-suited for the current political climate, were to blame for his loss in the 
nomination process.   
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More than 28,000 people, flooded Brooklyn’s Prospect Park in April 2016 to “Feel the Bern.” 
They were there to see Bernie Sanders, a self-proclaimed democratic socialist running for the 
Democratic presidential nomination. A longtime independent senator from Vermont, Sanders 
turned out to be an unexpectedly competitive candidate, routinely drawing tens of thousands to 
his campaign rallies with his radically progressive stump speeches.  His plan to transform 1
America along social democratic lines included reforms to slash income inequality and 
restructure Wall Street, raise wages, provide universal healthcare, tuition free college education, 
greatly expand social services and government investment. Bernie Sanders does not shy away 
from the socialist label and proudly states his support for creating Scandinavian style social 
democracy right here in America.  2
Socialism has long been a dangerously tainted association for those running for office in the 
United States. A damaging label for any but the most leftwing and radical national politicians 
operating outside the boundaries of the two-party system, socialism was something un-
American, impossible in this bastion of free-market capitalism. Openly socialistic policies were 
rarely discussed in earnest as viable reforms. Rather, it was demonized, and the persecution and 
ostracization its adherents faced is well known.  Even its more tame offshoot, social democracy, 3
which accepts basic principles of capitalism but intervenes significantly in the economy and 
society through social welfare programs and taxes to advance equality and ensure a high quality 
of life, was infeasible.   4
 Elizabeth Landers, “Bernie Sanders draws ‘record’ crowd in Prospect Park,” CNN, 18 April 2016, cnn.com.1
 John Nichols, The S Word: A Short History of an America Tradition… Socialism, (London: Verso, 2015): ix. 2
 Nichols, S Word, 128–131. 3
 Michael Harrington, Socialism: Past and Future, (London: Verso Publishing, 1989): 103.4
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However, socialism did not always, and perhaps does not now, carry this ruinous implication. 
So called “sewer socialists” won, and occasionally continue to win, local and state elections on 
platforms advocating increased infrastructure and public work investment, economic reforms and 
workers’ rights.  Yet these successes are all relatively limited to local elections, and on a 5
nationwide level, in the preeminent race for the presidency, socialists, third parties and social 
democrats are less successful.  6
Now here was Bernie Sanders, experiencing an incredible surge of popularity and prominence 
in the 2016 presidential election. Socialism burst onto the national political stage, refusing to be 
ignored, demanding to be taken seriously. People and parties are being forced to consider 
socialism, to discuss and debate its ideas and policies in a way unseen before. Bernie Sanders 
could represent a reorientation of American politics, toward previously unthinkable reforms and 
programs. Or he may be a mere blip, creating a leftwing ripple that will be unable to alter the 
national trajectory. Largely it depends on what gave rise to Sanders and social democracy in this 
moment, was it the result of long lasting or mainly momentary factors and trends. This thesis 
analyzes how and why Bernie Sanders emerged as a serious candidate but lost the nomination 
and how socialism came to be increasingly accepted as a legitimate political option. 
 Chris McGreal, “Socialist politician credits Bernie Sanders after re-election in Seattle,” The Guardian, 6 5
November 2015, theguardian.com. James Gregory and Jack Ross, “Socialist Party Votes, Membership, Newspapers, 
and Elected Officials by States and Counties,” Mapping American Socialist Movements Through the 20th Century, 
http://depts.washington.edu/moves, 2016. 
 Nichols, S Word, 108. 6
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LITERATURE REVIEW  
THE PRESIDENCY 
SITUATIONAL AND CYCLICAL FRAMEWORKS 
As Senator Sanders and socialism gained renewed public attention within the context of his bid 
for the presidency, it is necessary to consider theories particular to that office to understand his 
rise. Few areas of American politics garner the level of public attention and importance as the 
presidency. Perhaps this is because the presidency occupies a unique position, combining both an 
administrative office which operates as part of the larger governmental and political structure, 
and a highly personalistic position from which one individual wields great influence and 
authority.  Scholarship of the presidency tends to reflect this fascinating juxtaposition; explaining 7
the presidency based on an assessment of personal characteristics and skills or through 
contextualizing and grounding the presidency within a situational or historical framework. A 
personal skills approach sees presidential power as deriving from some combination of 
individual talents, persuasive power, emotional intelligence and personality.  8
However, in this thesis greater emphasis will be placed on theoretical frameworks which 
contextualize the presidency within the broader historical and political climate in order to 
illuminate the Sanders phenomena, and explore whether he was a revolutionary anomaly or part 
of a predictable political cycle. Countering the individualistic approach, Stephen Skowronek 
contends that fruitful analysis must take into account the political time in which presidents act, a 
 George C. Edwards III and Stephen J. Wayne, Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy Making, (New York: 7
St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 17. 
 Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power: the Politics of Leadership, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1961), 10; 8
James David Barber, The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House, (Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 6; Fred Greenstein, The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Barack 
Obama, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 3. 
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temporal context that can greatly impact presidential leadership, possibilities, victories and 
defeats in office.  This political time consists of the dominant structures and norms governing 9
politics, authority, societal attitudes and expectations.  It is episodic and is best characterized as 10
a series of regimes, organized around a set of basic governing commitments, that have occurred 
throughout American history.  In Skowronek’s analysis, there have been six clear regimes thus 11
far; with the New Deal Liberalism forged in 1932 by Franklin Roosevelt being replaced in 1980 
by a dominant conservative regime established by Ronald Reagan.   12
Reagan crafted the conservative regime by redefining the conditions and terms that legitimize 
national government and repudiating New Deal liberalism.  He articulated a new narrative 13
against “tax and spend” policies, large government, extensive social programs, and even the very 
word “liberal.”  The conservative regime places focus on tax cuts, increases in military 14
expenditures, domestic budget cuts and deregulating business.  Yet there has been debate as to 15
whether Reagan did in fact create a new era, with some scholars pointing to the endurance of 
liberal public policies and the lack of realignment in the Republican party.  Reagan’s 16
reconstruction was different than past regime builders and may appear to some to be a less 
fundamental regime transition because he was unable to enact sweeping changes to the 
 Stephen Skowronek, Presidential Leadership in Political Time: Reprise and Reappraisal, (Lawrence, KS: 9
University Press of Kansas Press, 2008), 77. 
 Skowronek, Presidential Leadership in Political Time, 19.10
 Skowronek, Presidential Leadership in Political Time, 20.11
 Skowronek, Presidential Leadership in Political Time, 84.12
 Skowronek, Presidential Leadership in Political Time, 96. 13
 Skowronek, Presidential Leadership in Political Time, 97. 14
 Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton, (Cambridge, 15
MA: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1997), 417.
 Larry Schwab, The Illusion of the Reagan Revolution, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1991); 16
Mary Allen Eisner and Kenneth J. Meier, “Presidential Control versus Bureaucratic Power: Explaining the Reagan 
Revolution in Antitrust” American Journal of Political Science 34, no. 1 (Feb. 1990), doi: 10.2307/2111519; Aaron 
L Haberman, “Tracing the Limits of the Reagan Revolution: The Christian Right and the Fate of School Prayer in 
the Age of Fracture, 1982–1984, The Journal of the Historical Society 13, no. 4 (December 2013), doi: 10.1111/jhis.
12030. 
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institutional framework of New Deal liberalism.  Skowronek identifies that with each 17
consecutive regime builder the institutional resilience of government has increased and is better 
able to withstand presidential attempts to fundamentally recast American politics.  Unable to 18
directly eliminate the institutional hallmarks of New Deal liberalism such as Social Security, 
Reagan attempted to use the budget to starve liberalism over time.  As such there was a less 19
seismic break with the old regime than has occurred in the past. However, numerous scholars 
have recognized that Reagan’s election substantively altered the basic set of commitments and 
norms in American politics.  20
Regimes can be weak or strong, depending on whether or not a majority of Americans still 
believe in their established principles and ideology. Furthermore, a president is either affiliated 
with or opposed to the party of the regime.  Skowronek creates a typology of these possibilities 21
to identify four recurrent structures of political authority. When there is a vulnerable regime and 
affiliated president, it is the politics of disjunction whereas a president opposed to a weak regime 
is in the politics of reconstruction. If the president opposes a regime by critiquing the basic 
ideological commitments, at a time when the regime still commands considerable public support, 
it is the politics of preemption. In articulation politics a president is associated with the strong 
 Skowronek, Presidential Leadership in Political Time, 98. 17
 Skowronek, Politics Presidents Make, 413. 18
 Skowronek, Presidential Leadership in Political Time, 98. 19
 Andrew E. Busch, Reagan’s Victory: The Presidential Election of 1980 and the Rise of the Right, (Lawrence, 20
KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 169; Jon A. Shields, “Fighting Liberalism’s Excesses: Moral Crusades 
During the Reagan Revolution,” Journal of Policy History 26, no. 1 (Jan. 2014), doi: 10.1017/S0898030613000390; 
Meg Jacobs and Julian E Zelizer, Conservatives in Power: The Reagan Years, 1981–1989, (Boston: Bedford/St. 
Martin’s Publishing, 2011); Robert M. Collins, Transforming America: Politics and Culture During the Reagan 
Years, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Robert Mason, “Ronald Reagan and the Republican Party: 
Responses to Realignment” in Ronald Reagan and the 1980s: Perceptions, Policies, Legacies, eds. Cheryl Hudson 
and Gareth Davies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
 Skowronek, Presidential Leadership in Political Time, 29. 21
!6
regime. Articulative presidents espouse dedication to orthodox regime principles and formulate 
those principles into concrete actions.   22
Each type creates a unique set of circumstances, leadership opportunities and challenges that 
substantially assist or circumscribe a president’s behavior and effectiveness.  For instance, a 23
president in the politics of reconstruction, such as Ronald Reagan, is in a position to become a 
regime builder by crafting and implementing a new epoch in political time.  On the other hand 24
preemptive presidents, like Bill Clinton or Richard Nixon, struggle against the confines of the 
prevailing order and battle to enact signature policies.  Disjunctive presidents, such as Carter, 25
are affiliated with a weak regime and attempt to revive it even as the desires of the American 
public become increasingly disjoined from the core principles and ideology.  26
Utilizing this broader framework enabled the study of Bernie Sanders and his bid for the 
presidency to escape the confines of the personalistic, horserace politics of the election and 
instead examined what he demonstrates about larger trends in America. Historically rooted and 
reoccurring schemes prevent an overemphasis on individuals that could obscure the true 
 Skowronek, Presidential Leadership in Political Time, 85.22
 Skowronek, Presidential Leadership in Political Time, 83.23
 Skowronek, Presidential Leadership in Political Time, 93. 24
 Skowronek, Presidential Leadership in Political Time, 113.25
 Skowronek, Presidential Leadership in Political Time, 87.26
Figure 1. Structures of Political Authority 
President’s Relation to Regime 
Affiliated Opposed 
Regime 
Strength 
Vulnerable Politics of disjunction Politics of reconstruction 
Resilient Politics of articulation Politics of preemption
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magnitude and character of changes in the political culture. Moreover, being out of step with 
political time by pursuing a political structure incompatible with current circumstances would 
circumscribe Sanders’ chances, regardless of other factors which abetted the rise of socialism in 
2016.  
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION  
No consideration of Bernie Sanders would be complete without looking at the candidate 
selection and nomination process of the presidential election. These theories will help to explain 
how he fared, the role socialism did or did not play in the strength of his candidacy, and what 
that denotes about the American political climate. Questions exists as to what matters to voters or 
party officials in the selection of a candidate, be it viability, momentum, personal character or 
some combination thereof. Examination of how key these traditional considerations were to his 
success and losses in the state primary races is crucial, given that many claimed Sanders’ true 
popularity was not accurately reflected by the 2016 nomination process.   27
Following reforms in the late 1960s some scholars felt voters had gained control over 
candidacy selections. Though evolving reforms over the years have favored the selection of 
certain candidates, they conclude that it is a vastly more democratic selection procedure than 
before.  Prior to the reforms, party leaders and top politicians controlled conventions and 28
delegate selection with the few state primaries largely functioning to verify that the chosen 
candidate was acceptable to voters.  Now voters in state primaries and caucuses select the 29
delegates who nominate the candidate at the national conventions. Others, however, argue 
 Dino P. Christenson and Erik D. Heidemann, “Superdelegates or Supertrustees? The Timing and Consistency of 27
Superdelegate Decisions,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 46, no. 3 (September 2016), doi: 10.1111/psq.12292
 Edwards and Wayne, Presidential Leadership, 24, 28. 28
 Marty Cohen, David Karol, Hans Noel, John Zaller, The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations Before and 29
After Reform, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 2. 
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political parties retain control through backdoor political arrangements and currying favor with 
crucial interest groups.   30
Regardless of this debate, questions remain as to what factors matter to voters or party elites 
when selecting a nominee. There is significant evidence that viability is an important factor, 
though disagreements over the scale of its impact and interaction with other elements abound. 
Viability is the chance a candidate has of becoming the nominee while electability is the 
possibility of becoming president.  Collingwood, Barreto and Donovan argue viability’s 31
saliency is demonstrated by voters changing candidate preference based on perceptions of 
viability within the larger phenomenon of momentum.  In the ideological and policy-starved 32
environment of the primary race, Guerran and Gurian contend that voters rely on a combination 
of viability and personal character, especially early in the contest.  Edwards and Wayne likewise 33
point to viability, either in the form of front-runner status or a surge in momentum, as a crucial 
factor for nominees.Yet they too stress the importance of an individual’s qualities and 
favorability.  This attention to candidate qualities has been challenged by Martin Wattenburg, 34
who demonstrates the import of personal characteristics to voters has declined while party 
identification has gained greater significance.  These factors of nomination, candidate viability, 35
and the dynamics of momentum are of vital importance to examining Bernie Sanders’ run for the 
 Cohen, Karol, Noel, Zaller, The Party Decides, 3, 5–7; Lara M. Brown, “Inside Parties: The Politics of Earning 30
the Presidential Nomination” in From Votes to Victory: Winning and Governing the White House in the 21st 
Century, ed. Meena Bose, (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2011), 13; Wayne P. Steger, A 
Citizen’s Guide to Presidential Nominations, (New York: Routledge, 2015), 4.
 Loren Collingwood, Matt A Barreto, Todd Donovan, “Early Primaries, Viability and Changing Preferences for 31
Presidential Candidates,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 42, no. 2 (2012): 233, doi: 10.1111/j.
1741-5705.2012.03964.x. 
 Collingwood, Barreto, Donovan, “Viability and Preferences for Candidates,” 234. 32
 Daniel G. Guerran and Paul–Henri Gurian, “The Changing Impact of Viability During the Presidential Primary 33
Season,” The Social Science Journal 33, no. 2 (1996): 140, doi: 10.1016/S0362-3319(96)90032-4. 
 Edwards and Wayne, Presidential Leadership, 39, 56–57, 67. 34
 Martin P. Wattenburg, “The Declining Relevance of Candidate Personal Attributes in Presidential Election,” 35
Presidential Studies Quarterly 46, no. 1 (March 2016):, 126, 138, Gale Academic OneFile. 
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presidency in 2016. Perceptions of his electability were inseparable from American attitudes 
regarding socialism, its feasibility in the United States and the potential long term shifts in 
political expectations this represents.  
SOCIALISM 
Neither Sanders, nor the current attitudes toward socialism, can be explained without a 
thorough grounding in the social and political history of American socialism. The question of 
why socialism or social democracy failed to gain hold in the United States has engendered many 
hypotheses and little to no consensus among scholars. Myriad factors and comparisons with 
other western industrial nations have been offered, each with its own merits and faults, scholarly 
detractors and defenders. Broadly, these explanations can be categorized as focusing on either 
the structural and institutional factors, or the cultural and social elements that impeded socialism. 
An examination of the increased prominence of socialism in 2016, what this may indicate about 
the lasting impacts of the Bernie Sanders campaign, and the broader political atmosphere in the 
U.S. must look at the continued pertinence of these various factors. Historical elements and 
theories articulated here are incorporated throughout the thesis in relation to the presidential 
framework and the electoral dynamics elucidated above.  
Theodore Lowi posits that the unique constitutional structure in the United States—the 
separation of powers, electoral system and most importantly federalism—prohibited the rise of a 
Socialist or Labor party.  Plurality “winner-take-all” voting inhibits the formation of third 36
parties as voters view these parties as a wasted vote. Added to this, the direct election of 
executives exacerbates vote-maximizing tendencies and the infeasibility of electing outsiders to 
 Theodore Lowi,”Why is there no socialism in the United States?” Society 22, no. 2 (1985), doi: 10.1007/36
BF02695379, 37.
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high office.  As influential as these elements are, Lowi argues it is the federalist structure, which 37
allocates different powers and responsibilities for the federal and state governments, that most 
impeded a nationwide socialist movement. Conditions and laws affecting labor were controlled 
by individual states and varied across the country. Therefore, the ire and efforts of workers was 
directed toward state laws, local officials and political machines—not the national government.  38
The lack of shared political experience and grievance among workers created little unity on 
which socialists could build a convincing critique of American capitalism.  Konstantin Vossing 39
expanded on this to explain the incorporation of workers and labor grievances by establishment 
parties disincentivized the formation of a third party or socialist agitation, and drove labor unions 
to choose nonpolitical moderate syndicalism over social democracy.  40
Another structurally based theory offered by John Kaustkey cites the lack of feudalism, which 
elsewhere resulted in socially and politically isolated workers.  However, in America workers 41
did not view themselves as radically different or excluded from the other classes.  Rather, quite 42
the opposite myth existed that the top was open to all and even the lowliest could strive hard and 
be accepted there. Therefore the formation of a clear class consciousness was severely impeded 
in America.   43
There are multiple social and cultural elements particular to the United States that scholars 
view as proscribing socialist growth. Seymour Martin Lipset and Gary Marks, in It Didn’t 
Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States, expound on this notion of American 
 Lowi, “No Socialism in the United States?” 38. 37
 Lowi, “No Socialism in the United States?” 39.38
 Lowi, “No Socialism in the United States?” 40. 39
 Konstantin Vossing, “Predictably Exceptional: The failure of social democracy and the formation of American 40
labor politics in comparative perspective” Party Politics 20, no. 5 (2014), 768–773, doi:10.1177/1354068812453371.
 John Kautsky, Social Democracy and Aristocracy, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 33. 41
 Kautsky, Social Democracy and Aristocracy, 134.42
 Kautsky, Social Democracy and Aristocracy, 135.43
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exceptionalism. Lipset and Marks describe American values, that is “Americanism,” as almost an 
ideology in itself, opposed to many socialist tenets and appeals. They summarize Americanism 
as anti-statism, laissez faire economics, individualism, populism and egalitarianism.  Socialist 44
calls for an interventionist state, a heavily controlled supervised economy, collectives and group 
effort appear to stand in clear opposition to “Americanism.” Despite being critiqued as 
overstating the divergence between the United States and other nations, scholars continue to 
offer interpretations following this basic premise.  45
A particular feature that garnered considerable attention by Lipset and Marks is the lack of 
homogeneity in the working class as compared to other Western industrial countries.  The 46
working class in the U.S. was astonishingly diverse. Unity and class solidarity, cornerstone 
principles of socialism, were hard to attain within a class split between the America-born and 
“new immigrants,” ethnic diversity, skilled and unskilled labor, animosity between Protestants 
and Catholics and black and white workers.  47
The wealth and relative affluence of workers in America is seen by some, including Lipset and 
Marks, Buhle and Lowi, as another component that diminished the desire for socialism and 
revolution.  First proposed by Werner Sombart in 1906, the logic was that the material comfort 48
of American laborers, higher real wages and standard of living compared to Europeans 
 Lipset and Marks, It Didn’t Happen Here, 30. 44
 Lowi, “No Socialism in the United States?” 36; Robin Archer, Why Is There No Labor Party in the United 45
States? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 2. 
 Lipset and Marks, It Didn’t Happen Here, 132.46
 Lipset and Marks, It Didn’t Happen Here, 127, Archer, Why Is There No Labor Party, 198; Lipset and Marks, It 47
Didn’t Happen Here, 136. 
 Lipset and Marks, It Didn’t Happen Here; Paul Buhle, Marxism in the United States, (London: Verso 48
Publishing, 2013); Lowi, “No Socialism in the United States?” 
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diminished anger over poor conditions and the need for socialistic changes.  Robin Archer 49
contends that, while the comparison holds for England and Germany, this factor cannot be 
overstated as workers enjoying similar conditions elsewhere formed labor parties regardless.  50
Consideration of these factors is necessary to fully understand the current challenges facing 
socialism and the possibilities of its revival in America today. Of immediate concern and direct 
relevance is which factors remain salient in modern America and which are lasting structural 
impediments. Each of these pieces is used as a lens with which to view Sanders, and the current 
American political and social landscape, to detect the changes that contributed to socialism’s 
recent surge. To reveal potential shifts in political culture and public attitudes that may help 
explain Bernie Sanders’ rise, both recent developments regarding socialism and individual 
historical factors are reexamined for relevance in 2016. 
PROSPECTS 
Socialism failed to catch on in America, but what do scholars believe is the possible future of 
socialism in America? Such ideas contextualize Bernie Sanders’ run as a socialist in the 2016 
election within the larger milieu of leftwing politics, activism and theory. Explanations offered 
here on the popularity and prospects of socialism are of pressing importance and consequence to 
the topic and are applied directly to Bernie Sanders.  
While some propose a gradualist path toward a new modern socialism, others, like Paul Buhle, 
suggest Marxism, class struggle and consciousness are still relevant.  He points to the 2011 51
Wisconsin Uprising, the weeks-long occupation of the capitol building to defend unions and the 
 Werner Sombart, “American Capitalism’s Economic Rewards,” in Failure of a Dream? Essays in the History of 49
American Socialism, Revised edition, ed. John H. M. Laslett and Seymour Martin Lipset (Berkley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1984), 458. 
 Archer, Why Is There No Labor Party, 24.50
 Harrington, Socialism: Past and Future, Buhle, Marxism in the United States. 51
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2011 Occupy movement, as demonstrating an undercurrent which could be tapped for socialist 
change.  Similarly, Noam Chomsky has framed the Occupy movement as developing from 52
decades of class warfare—its lasting accomplishments are the movement building associations 
and networks it formed among leftwing activists.  Furthermore, other scholars point to the 53
Movements’ effectiveness in raising national awareness of economic inequality and injustice as a 
measure of its success.  54
Lane Kenworthy, in Social Democratic America, predicts that the rising wealth in the U.S., an 
increasingly risky, uncertain economy and faltering supportive institutions, like labor unions, will 
compel social democratic changes.  He details the economic feasibility and construction of 55
programs often championed by Sanders, including expanded social insurance, job training and 
higher minimum wage.  After countering myriad arguments he concludes social democracy is 56
not only necessary, but a viable political alternative supported by Americans.  57
In a distinct contrast to many of the above scholars, John Nichols largely rejects the notion that 
socialism failed in the United States.  Rather, he traces the strong socialist threads in American 58
history, seen in the hundreds of socialists who have governed at the state and local level, to show 
that it is not alien or anti-American, but deeply rooted in the country.  When applied to Bernie 59
Sanders, this casts his mayorship and steady ascendance in electoral politics in a less anomalous, 
 Buhle, Marxism in the United States, xvi, xvii. 52
 Noam Chomsky, Occupy: Reflections on Class War, Rebellion and Solidarity, (Westfield, NJ: Zuccotti Park 53
Press, 2013). 
 Christopher Malone and Violet Fredericks, “OWS and US Electoral Politics: An Early Critical Assessment” in 54
Occupy Political Science, eds. Emily Welty, Mathew Bolton, Meghana Nayak and Christopher Malone, (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
 Lane Kenworthy, Social Democratic America, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 4. 55
 Kenworthy, Social Democratic America, 49–54, 70.56
 Kenworthy, Social Democratic America, 150, 177–180.57
 Nichols, S Word, xxiv. 58
 Nichols, S Word, 106; Jack Ross, The Socialist Party of America: A Complete History, (New York: Potomac 59
Press, 2015). 
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and prophetic light. Instead, the popularity of socialism and Sanders becomes a question of 
reintroducing a long present, but overlooked, strand of American political culture.  The 60
predictions of these authors is analyzed against the actual trajectory of the Sanders’ campaign, 
along with the most up-to-date polls and surveys, in order to uncover the elements, themes and 
theories that help to explain Sanders and socialism in 2016.  
METHODOLOGY  
This thesis is a single, explanatory case study covering the contest for the Democratic 
nomination in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Specifically it looks at the candidacy of 
Senator Bernie Sanders, focusing on and aiming to explain public attitudes towards, and 
increased acceptance of, socialism. In order to measure and contextualize crucial changes data 
was gathered not only from the fifteen month period of Sanders’ campaign but from public 
opinion polls and economic statistics stretching back over the last decade and into the 20th 
century when available.  
Firstly, this thesis establishes a guiding theoretical framework by examining how Bernie 
Sanders fits into the structures of political authority—determined by the resilience of the regime 
and an individuals’ relationship to it—and if he positioned himself as the candidate best suited 
for the current realities of political time or not.  A Democratic president elected in 2016 could 61
be in a disjunctive, preemptive or articulative structure depending on whether Obama was 
reconstructive and forged a new regime, or was preemptive and the conservative regime endures 
today. Sanders’ own rhetoric can be used as a measure; from his less than adulatory remarks 
about President Obama, to branding himself an outsider and calling his campaign a political 
 Nichols, S Word, 266. 60
 Skowronek, Presidential Leadership in Political Time, 167–192. 61
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revolution—all indicated he was pursuing reconstructive politics.  As reconstructive leaders 62
follow disjunctive presidents, which Obama most certainly was not, this appears to be out of step 
with political time.  Differing possible combinations are used to determine whether Sanders’ 63
relative successes and failures as a candidate were in spite of, due to, or regardless of his socialist 
label. After presenting the implication of this broader theory—in order to clearly identify and 
examine changes over time—the thesis is then grouped into three thematically related sections: 
economic considerations, electoral factors and elements pertaining to social and political culture.  
Changes to the various political and social attitudes that once hindered socialism in the U.S. are 
reexamined for relevance in 2016 using data drawn from pertinent polls. The American public’s 
changing opinion of socialism can be measured by looking at surveys such as the YouGov poll 
asking, “Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of socialism?” and a Pew survey that 
asked “Do you have a positive or negative reaction to the word socialism?”  Similarly, 64
comparing historic and current polling results reveals changes to the social conditions 
contributing to socialism’s historic failure: from shifts in the ideology of “Americanism” to 
perceptions of class and equality, social mobility, opportunity and divisions of race or ethnicity.  65
The persistence or diminution of American views against active government, the possibility of 
 Bernie Sanders with Huck Gutman, Outsider in the White House, (London: Verso, 2015); Jim Tankersley, 62
“Bernie Sanders on America’s ‘grotesquely unfair’ society,” The Washington Post, 16 July 2015, http://
washingtonpost.com. 
 Skowronek, Presidential Leadership in Political Time, 168–170. 63
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economic and social advancement and the prominence of racial divisions would explain growing 
acceptance toward socialism in the 2016 campaign and the rise of Bernie Sanders.  
The electoral factors section examines what effect structural elements in the nomination of 
candidates and changing public attitudes in light of electoral wins and losses had on Sanders’ 
campaign. Factors that historically diminished votes for socialists—such as federalism, vote 
maximizing and worker acceptance of the two party system—are analyzed by looking at past and 
current electoral data and polls on whether Americans still view the two party system as 
sufficiently representative, how desire and support for third parties has changed, if independent 
identification has increased. The endurance of vote maximizing can be seen by comparing pre-
election support of third party candidates to actual electoral results. Measuring the proliferation 
of federal versus state labor laws and polls on whether citizens are more concerned about 
economic issues controlled at the state or federal level show changes that might have spurred 
voters to direct economic dissatisfaction toward national politics. Polls of voters showing Bernie 
Sanders’ viability and electability increasing, in comparison to both Hillary Clinton and 
Republican front runners, after primary wins, and mounting and fading momentum indicate how 
important the socialist label was to voters in comparison to other considerations. This section 
incorporates relevant historical parallels to, and polling data on, figures such as socialist Eugene 
Debs and the populist Robert LaFollete to parse how Sanders and the circumstances of 2016 
differed.  
Economic elements and their role in garnering support for socialism and Sanders in 2016 were 
analyzed. Recent surveys and statistics from the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics were used to measure changes to the standard of living, wages and economic security 
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that have been credited with disincentivizing workers from socialism to see if significant 
decreases prompted a turn toward socialistic ideas among Americans. This was coupled with 
polls measuring American perceptions of capitalism, economic inequality and opportunity. 
Finally, the role of movements like Occupy Wall Street and the Fight for a $15 minimum wage in 
bringing issues relevant to socialism—such as economic injustice and class division—to the fore 
of American politics is considered using appropriate polls tracking saliency and the timeline of 
the movement.  
STUDY  
POLITICAL TIME   
The success and failures of Bernie Sanders’ campaign, from his meteoric rise to his ultimate 
inability to capture the Democratic nomination, are due not only to perceptions of socialism but 
also to how Sanders was situated within political time and fit into the structure of political 
authority. Current political time is largely determined by whether Barack Obama was a 
reconstructive or preemptive president, and if he forged a new regime or if Reagan’s 
conservative one is still in ascendance. These possibilities would constrict Bernie Sanders’ 
appropriateness in political time depending on how he in turn presented himself—as a 
preemptive, articulative or transformative leader. While Sanders’ socialist label is obviously 
intertwined with his self-presentation, the import of socialism here should not be overstated. 
Being at odds with political time would contribute to his failure and diminish the role socialism 
had in in his inability to secure a majority of voters in the primary.  
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One potential interpretation of President Obama is he was a reconstructive leader who spurned 
the conservative regime and founded a new epoch in American politics.  There are several 66
conditions matching the historic trends which support this conclusion and refute key arguments 
against it. Firstly, reconstruction has followed directly after a calamitous event which thoroughly 
discredited the old regime and an affiliated disjunctive leader whose attempts to reinvigorate the 
enervated system failed. President George W. Bush and the financial crisis of 2008 fit with this 
pattern—exposing the weakness of old commitments and opening the door to an out-right 
repudiation of the regime by Obama.  Claims that Obama could not be a transformative leader 67
due to his pursuit of unity and rhetoric of consensus falter given that characteristically 
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reconstructive presidents have all presented a unifying message and initiate cooperation on key 
reform programs.  If true that a new regime had begun then the historical cycle and conditions 68
would indicate a Democratic president following Obama would be an orthodox innovator, 
aligned with the resilient regime.  
Orthodox presidents directly following transformative leaders, such as Harry Truman after 
FDR or George H. W. Bush after Reagan, generally build upon, refine and push through the 
goals of the dawning epoch.  Often appearing as reign-extending surrogates of the 69
reconstructive president, these presidents must deal with the practical business of creating a 
concrete system of government out of the newly founded orders’ commitments.  A Democratic 70
presidential candidate pursuing articulation—and in alignment with the trend of political time—
would therefore project an agenda of building upon the legacy of Barack Obama.  
Bernie Sanders has by no means disavowed President Obama or his signature policy initiatives, 
but neither has he been effusive and unreserved in his praise. While supporting the Affordable 
Care Act, Sanders claims the bill did not go far enough, advocating for a single-payer, universal 
healthcare system instead.  He criticized Obama for going against his campaign promises and 71
siding with Republicans to cut Social Security cost-of-living adjustments.  Along those lines 72
Sanders objected to deal-making with Republicans that resulted in what he called weak 
legislative agreements that disappointed millions of Americans.  Sanders hesitated to endorse 73
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Obama in 2012 and stated they have categorical disagreements on certain policies, for instance 
saying, “he’s [Obama] wrong on the trade issue, dead wrong.”  Such careful and delineated 74
distancing indicates that as a candidate for president Bernie Sanders was not aiming to be a 
leader refining the narrative of the fledgling regime, as the political time model would call for if 
Obama were a reconstructive president.  
At least a portion then of Sanders’ failure as a nominee would be due to this and Hillary 
Clintons’ ability to cast her potential presidency as a consolidation of Obamas’ reconstructive 
charge. She emphasized building on the accomplishments of the Affordable Care Act and 
continuing Obama’s approach on foreign policy.  Even Clinton’s struggle to unite members of 75
the coalition is characteristic of first round orthodox leaders, as disparate elements brought 
together by the new regime argue over the implementation and purity of foundational 
commitments.  Fitting well into the historical rhythm of presidential leadership structures 76
strengthened Clinton’s campaign, regardless of whether Bernie Sanders was espousing socialism 
or not.  
However, there are numerous reasons to doubt President Obama was a reconstructive leader 
and instead argue the conservative regime endures today. In this case, Obama would be in the 
politics of preemption, opposed to the dominant regime while in office. Several key elements 
that have always accompanied reconstructive presidents are missing from Obama’s situation 
which point strongly towards him being an opposition leader. Notably there have always been at 
least two opposition presidents prior to the transformative leader taking office. Barack Obama 
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was the second Democratic president after Bill Clinton and, as is historically typical, his 
rejection of Reagan’s order was more forceful than Clinton’s.  As noted above, reconstruction 77
follows disjunction and a strong case can be made that George W. Bush did not fit this mold. His 
presidency did not engender a protracted crisis of confidence in, and widespread discrediting of, 
the conservative regime.  The potential crisis of legitimacy posed by the 2008 financial 78
meltdown offered no clean break with the conservative regime because Obama was involved in 
stabilizing the very system he was attempting to repudiate.  Furthermore, the movement that 79
accompanied Barack Obamas’ 2008 election was more akin to previous second round preemptive 
leaders—who build coalitions that will form the base for later transformative presidents—than of 
a reconstructive president. Typically, broad-based mass social movements, developed during the 
disjunctive phase of the old regime, are independent from but bolster an ascending reconstructive 
leader. By contrast, the force supporting Barack Obamas’ 2008 campaign was mainly 
personalistic.  Finally, the election of Donald Trump weakens the claim of reconstruction as 80
well because all true regime builders have been followed directly by another president from their 
party. The weight of the evidence indicates Obama was the second round preemptive leader in 
the conservative regime that still forms the foundation of current American political norms and 
expectations.  
Given this perspective on Obama and political time two structures of political authority, 
preemption or reconstruction, would be possible for the next Democratic president. He or she 
would intensify the criticism of Reagan’s regime, expanding on Obama’s denunciation just as he 
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did on Bill Clinton’s. Akin to Barack Obama, Woodrow Wilson, and Richard Nixon, the next 
preemptive leader could build an ever stronger coalition against the dominant structures.  Yet 81
paradoxically he or she may also be more independent of the party, attempting to forge a third 
way and reach beyond the base. This is because preemptive leaders are attempting to find an 
alternative conception of national government just as transformative leaders do, but flounder 
against the still resilient regime.  For this reason preemptive leaders also often have a signature 82
issue or area of concern rather than a more comprehensive government wide repudiation.   83
Senator Sanders displays, to some degree, all of these emblematic features of preemptive 
leadership. For all that Sanders discusses a variety of policies, from the environment to foreign 
affairs, but he consistently emphasized economic issues—particularly income inequality, the 
super rich and the “rigged economy.”  This has been his signature issue from his time as a 84
mayor in Vermont through his tenure in the Senate.  Even though this often comes couched in 85
the language of large scale change, it is limited to a particular sector, just as Bill Clinton’s issue 
was health care or Wilson’s was transforming international relations through the League of 
Nations. Sanders escalated the charge against the conservative regime, disparaging its basic 
commitments by calling for tax increases and growing social programs.  The appearance of 86
pursuing reconstructive politics may be due to the especially strident nature of his preemptive 
attacks, again not historically uncommon for similarly placed opposition leaders.  Regarding 87
preemptive presidents autonomy from the party, Bernie Sanders was, of course, an independent 
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for the vast majority of his political career, only joining the Democratic party in 2015 in order to 
run for the presidential nomination.  While such opposition leadership is correct for the political 88
time, Sanders’ failure in the primary could be due to the perception that he was pursing 
reconstruction and only in part to other elements such as socialism. Again this represents a 
rejection of Sanders’ reconstructive argument by Democratic voters who selected the nominee, 
not an electorate-wide mandate against transformation. Democratic voters, in selecting Hillary 
Clinton, favored the consolidation of Obama’s legacy rather than the reconstructionist argument 
against both Republican and Democratic elites espoused by Sanders.  
Under the conditions of political time there is a slight chance that the next Democratic 
president could be transformative, but coming directly after another Democrat diminishes the 
probability. The same issues that stunted Obama’s ability to be transformative, namely the lack 
of a developed disjunctive phase and national disillusionment with the conservative regime, 
would even more severely impede a Democratic president in 2017. No social movement against 
the conservative regime had ripened into a mass force comparable in scale to the previous 
abolition or conservative movements. Past regime builders have succeeded presidents from the 
other party, never presidents of the same political orientation, and such an occurrence would be 
highly implausible and unprecedented. Bernie Sanders portraying his candidacy as crafting a 
new regime and fundamentally altering the national trajectory and governing objectives would be 
grossly out of line with political time.  
Yet, based on his own rhetoric and behavior during the 2016 race for the Democratic 
presidential nomination, Senator Sanders indicated he would attempt regime reconstruction as 
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president and be a transformative leader. The evidence for this is writ large in Sanders’ campaign 
book, his speeches, his interviews and his official policies.  Sanders speaks of a political 89
revolution, one that would move America toward what it should really be about; equality and 
democracy.  Sanders spoke often of changing the status quo of American politics. This is a 90
classic reconstructive appeal, as is his continual, and legitimate, claims to be an outsider to the 
established political system.  Sanders attempted considerable coalition building, which Sanders 91
has emphasized dating back to his time as mayor and U.S. representative.  Along the 92
reconstructive mold this was framed as a realignment of the party, of making the economically 
downtrodden, the young, the working class and their issues the core of the Democratic party.  93
As detailed above, an attempt could be made to frame Sanders as oppositional. However, the key 
issue is not the actual structure of authority Sanders’ presidency would have developed had he 
been elected, but which structure he portrayed himself as pursing during the race.  
Ultimately, regardless of whether Obama was a transformational president or an oppositional 
one, the 2016 race was not suited for a Democratic candidate to fruitfully pursue reconstructive 
politics. Such profound discordance with political time, with the structure of leadership most 
feasible under current political conditions and the demonstrated trends of American presidents, 
surely hurt the chances of Sanders’ campaign. Neither groups newly-disillusioned by the old 
regime, nor a mass social movement created over years of opposition, were in place to usher 
Sanders to victory. The so-called Obama coalition, widely supporting his actions and gains, did 
 Sanders, Outsider in the White House; Tasini, The Essential Bernie Sanders; “Bernie Sanders On the Issues,” 89
Bernie 2016, http://berniesanders.com, 2016;–Bernie Sanders, “What is a Socialist?” (speech, Georgetown, VA, 19 
November 2015).
 Sanders, Outsider in the White House, xv, xvii. 90
 Sanders, Outsider in the White House. 91
 Sanders, Outsider in the White House, 40. 92
 Bernie Sanders, interviews by Sam Frizell, “Q&A: Bernie Sanders on the Future of the Democratic Party,” Time 93
Magazine, 26 May 2016, http://time.com. 
!25
not look favorably at that moment toward a candidate hoping to break a new path and an 
alternate coalition. Being out of sync in political time left Bernie Sanders without either a new, 
broad-based movement nor the stalwart, traditional party voters to draw support from. 
Of course the reconstructive vision Sanders formulated was based on social democratic 
policies, but the inability to secure the nomination and forge a new regime can be credited at 
least in large part to inopportune political time. Further detailed discussion of how socialism and 
how the socialist aspect furthered and hindered Sanders’ campaign is covered below. From an 
analysis of larger presidential and cyclical trends it can be concluded that it was not only 
socialism, but the discordance between the attempted and the feasible political structures that 
influenced Sanders’ successes and failures. 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES  
Perhaps the most crucial elements to consider in this thesis are those pertaining to a potential 
change in the social and political attitudes of Americans which opened the door for socialism and 
Sanders as serious political options in 2016. This includes not just public opinion of socialism 
directly but also factors that once hindered the appeal of socialism in the United States. Declines 
in anti-statist sentiments, in cleavages over race, in the belief that upward mobility is possible 
and the class hierarchy is fluid, would all create an environment more ripe for socialism than 
existed in previous decades. By the same measure, persistence of these attitudes would mitigate 
the potential positive effect other elements—such as Sanders’ electability as a candidate or a 
dismal economic situation—had on his campaign and socialism in 2016.  
In order to account for the rise of Bernie Sanders and socialism it is critical to determine what 
the current general public opinion in America of socialism is, and how that has changed over 
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time. As no single public opinion poll has consistently inquired into views on socialism over 
multiple decades, various sporadic surveys utilizing different questions were used to analyze 
trends. One of the earliest public opinion surveys of Americans from 1936 seems to show a stark 
distaste for socialism. Fewer than 2% of respondents described themselves as “socialists” rather 
than Republicans, Democrats or Independents. Furthermore, if forced to choose between living 
under fascism or communism, 35% to 25% picked fascism. Yet this poll may exaggerate the 
negative view of socialism, as it had many flaws and methodological errors impermissible today. 
The sample was not representative of American society, skewing heavily male, well-off, and 
white. Potentially sympathetic views towards socialism held by the poor and minorities were 
obscured.  94
More regular polling on American attitudes regarding socialism began in 2010, with research 
conducted by both Gallup and Pew Research Center. The fact that the question was even asked is 
itself noteworthy. That socialism had become a topic which warranted serious, nationwide 
investigation by reputable research organizations speaks to the rising awareness and prominence 
of socialism in the United States. In a January 2010 Gallup poll, when asked if they had a 
positive or negative view of socialism, 36% of Americans replied a positive view, given the 
margin of error the “true” number could be between 32 and 40 percent.  An April 2010 Pew poll 95
portrayed slightly less favorability at a mere 29%, however once the 3.5% variability of the poll 
is factored in it is possible that no substantive shift in either direction was seen. By 2011 the 
number ticked up slightly to 31% ±2.5%.  A further slight increase, to 39%, was visible in 96
 Jodie T. Allen, “How a Different America Responded to the Great Depression,” Pew Research Center for the 94
People and the Press, 14 December 2010, http://pewresearch.org. 
 Frank Newport, “Socialism Viewed Positively by 36% of Americans,” Gallup, 4 February 2010, http://95
www.gallup.com. 
 “Survey on Political Rhetoric,” Pew, PDF, (7–11 December 2011). 96
!27
Gallup’s 2012 survey. Here, accounting for the respective margins of error, the minimum 
increase in support was 2.5% but could be as high as 15%.   97
Just weeks after Bernie Sanders’ informal announcement of his candidacy in April 2015, 
YouGov conducted a survey of socialism’s favorability in the United States. Support had actually 
decreased, to a meager 26% ±4%, while the favorably of capitalism hovered at 52% ±4%. 
However 28% ±4% reported being enthusiastic or comfortable with presidential candidates 
describing themselves as socialists.  By June an astounding 47% ±3% indicated they would vote 98
for the party nominee who, being otherwise generally well qualified, happened to be a socialist.  99
It should be noted this incredible number may not reflect an actively positive view, nor personal 
identification with socialism, so much as the attitude toward others who espouse socialism. What 
is key is so many agree, even implicitly, that a socialist could ever be well qualified to be 
president of the United States. Favorability of socialism then inched up marginally by January 
2016 to 29% ± 4.4% but the Gallup poll indicated little change, at 35% ±4% positivity in May 
2016.   100
Among the general populace the favorability and positive outlook toward socialism stayed 
relatively static from 2010 through the 2015–2016 candidacy of Bernie Sanders. Unfavorability
—which denotes a more active and hostile outlook toward socialism—also did not decline to any 
significant degree. A change here could have indicated that while Americans did not increasingly 
like socialism many felt less outright hostility and opposition to it. This was clearly not the 
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case.  While not unspeakably low, support for socialism as an idea in itself—not as a secondary 101
candidate characteristic—remained solidly below 40%. Clearly no great sea change on socialism 
occurred prior to Sanders’ candidacy to explain his rise, nor did his run coalesce into a sudden 
upswell of support for socialism. Yet closer analysis of respondents under the age of 30 shows a 
nuanced view that helps to explain Sanders and the prominence of socialism.  
Young people between the ages of eighteen and thirty demonstrated not just generally higher 
levels of support for socialism but also increased support over time. The same YouGov poll 
noted above showed that favorability of socialism rose 7% between May 2015 and January 2016 
among those under 30. In fact the favorability of socialism overtook that of capitalism, which fell 
7%, thought a considerable margin of error in both polls makes the possible change in support as 
high as 15 or a low as 2 percent. A larger number of young people said they were more likely to 
vote for Sanders because of his socialism than those over the age of thirty.  Results from a 102
Harvard poll show a solid 16% of eighteen to twenty-nine year olds identify as socialists, barely 
below the 19% identifying as capitalists. The slight margin of error makes it likely that the true 
support is roughly the same, given the range of 13.5% to 18.5% support for socialism and 16.5% 
to 21.5% for capitalism.  A remarkable 55% in May 2016 held a positive view of socialism.  103 104
So while most Americans, especially older and more conservative individuals, remained 
lukewarm toward socialism the considerable support among young people may have proved 
critical in shifting Sanders and socialism toward political feasibility.  Despite this, the overall 105
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lack of direct support for socialism indicates other shifts in political attitudes must account more 
heavily in explaining the renewed viability of socialism and Sanders.  
The anti-statist views of Americans have long been counted as a black mark against socialism, 
as public opposition to government power and intervention undermines implementing numerous 
socialistic policies.  Softer feelings toward big government in recent years would partially 106
explain Sanders’ rhetoric catching on in 2016.  
Earlier in the 20th century Americans displayed a remarkably high level of support for 
increasing the size and scope of government. In the late 1930s 76% favored the government 
providing free medical care for the poor, 59% wanted public ownership of the electric power 
industry and a plurality supported the concentration of power in the federal rather than state 
government. While the polls from 1937 must be contextualized by the intense and partially 
anomalous circumstances of the Great Depression, they also indicate abiding historic roots for 
such sentiments among modern Americans.  Moreover, this hints at a trend in attitude toward 107
government that persists today; Americans dislike sizable and powerful government in the 
abstract but favor a plethora of actual or proposed government programs. For more than a decade 
over half of Americans have said the federal government has too much power and big 
government is a larger threat to the future of the country than big business or big labor.  108
However, the General Social Survey (GSS) indicated when it came to actual programs and issues 
Americans were quite receptive and enthusiastic about government action. Since the late 1970s 
the GSS has shown that over 80% believe the government spends the right amount or too little 
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on improving the educations system, improving the nation’s health, Social Security and on 
“assistance to the poor.”  The increased viability of socialism is then in line with sentiments 109
supportive of government actions, and Bernie Sanders was successful in simply linking long held 
desires with the idea of socialism. This is consistent with the analysis of John Nichols, who 
details regional socialist victories in the United States—largely due to and maintained by the 
kind of popular social and infrastructure programs proposed by Sanders—as indicative of deeply 
rooted socialist traditions and sentiments in the United States.  Obviously, government 110
programs alone do not constitute socialism, and this is not to imply Americans do not have a 
more complicated and nuanced conception of the term. Surely there are many who cherish 
certain programs, like Medicare, while heartily decrying socialism. However, given Sanders 
himself emphasized such programs as a key compete of his socialist message, public opinions 
are an additional and helpful overtone to the discussion of socialism in 2016.  
As an idea necessitating considerable class unity, the development of socialism suffered in the 
United States due to deep social divisions based on race.  Whether this roadblock was 111
overcome in 2016 to a degree that abets socialism is unclear, as racial tensions and concerns are 
high, but so is optimism and support for a solution. Nearly 60 percent of Americans in 2015 
thought that diversity makes the U.S. a better place to live, but the perception of racism and 
division in the country was increasingly grim.  From 2009 to 2016 there was an increase, of 112
between 4 to 16 percent, in those who believed black people suffered from widespread racism 
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and the number of Americans saying that black-white relations were good reached the lowest 
point since 2001.  While an increasing number are concerned a “great deal” about race 113
relations it was not even among the top ten issues of greatest concern in 2016.  However, hopes 114
are high that an eventual solution will be worked out, and an increasing percentage of Americans 
favor the government playing a major role in improving the social and economic condition of 
minorities.  The outright prejudices that had once driven working class Americans to prioritize 115
racial divisions over economic solidarity may have diminished to a point where they could be 
overcome when combined with other economic incentives and political attitudes favoring 
socialism.  
Yet there is another distinct possibility indicated by recent polling. A 2015 survey found half of 
white Americans believe that racism against whites has become as big of a problem as 
discrimination against blacks and other minorities. Among working class whites the number 
skyrockets to 60% ±2.6%.  It is highly probable that working class individuals, especially 116
whites, do not necessarily prioritize race over economic problems so much as associate and 
blame those economic issues on racial minorities   
A final cultural element that massively impacts political attitudes and possibilities in the United 
States is the belief in social and economic mobility for all, the American Dream that given hard 
work all people in America can succeed.  Collapse in support for this narrative would create an 117
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environment more welcoming of socialist policies promoting equality and Bernie Sanders’ 
language about transforming the United States into a place where all can get ahead regardless of 
wealth. A large number of Americans consistently say working hard is critical to success but a 
slightly decreasing percentage are satisfied with the level of opportunity these hard workers have 
to get ahead. In 2009 79% ±3.4% believed it possible to get ahead with over 80% ±3.4% saying 
hard work and ambition were essential, far above those who credited family wealth or luck for an 
individuals’ success.  Polls spanning from 1994 to 2012 indicate a steady belief in the ability to 118
get ahead, with only slight and periodic dips during economic downturns.  Yet in 2013 a bare 119
majority stated there was “plenty of opportunity” to advance, part of a steady decline from 87% 
±4% in 1952.  Similarly, satisfaction with the opportunity to progress through hard work 120
declined from 77% ±4% in 2002 to 62% ±4% in 2016, after falling to 53% ±4% in 2012.  At 121
the moment the survey was conducted temporary economic conditions effected, perhaps unduly, 
the level of satisfaction but a trend can still be parsed from the fluctuating numbers 
While Americans still think it is possible to move up if someone is willing to work hard, they 
also feel the struggle is too difficult, and there should be greater opportunity. A plurality agreed 
government generally does more to hurt than help mobility, but a wide majority actually 
supported programs designed to increase opportunity for individuals—such as making education 
affordable, reducing healthcare costs and providing job training.  As Sanders commonly 122
expressed the same frustration with the opportunity to advance and sought to implement those 
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policies, the shift in American attitudes surely contributed to how well his candidacy was 
received in 2016.  
ELECTORAL FACTORS  
It is clear that the detectable shifts and persistence in social and political attitudes are 
enormously helpful for explaining the surprising openness toward socialism and Bernie Sanders 
in 2016 but alone are only a small part of the larger puzzle. Other explanatory elements must be 
added and examined in order to more thoroughly and satisfactorily answer the question of 
Sanders and socialism in 2016. It is also crucial to remember Sanders, for all his unexpected 
success, failed to capture the Democratic presidential nomination. Therefore, the elements which 
once damaged the potential electoral success of socialist candidates in the United States were 
examined. If such barriers had diminished then the final failure of Sanders had more to do with 
voters’ opposition to him and or to his socialist ideas than the system itself. Moreover, examining 
the correlation between the rise and fall of Sanders in the polls and his wins and losses in 
primary elections illustrate how crucial socialism was in contrast to traditional considerations 
like momentum and name recognition.  
The electoral success of the Socialist Party was forestalled by workers’ widespread acceptance 
of the two party system as capable of representing and addressing lower class grievances.  Yet 123
even in the late 1930s there is evidence that, compared to the last twenty five years of the 
nineteenth century, variability in voting had expanded and Americans were increasingly willing 
to abandon party loyalty in favor of alternative candidates.  Since then an ever growing 124
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percentage of Americans have expressed dissatisfaction with the two party system in the United 
States, especially in the the last decade. When asked if Republicans and Democrats do an 
adequate job representing America or if a third party is needed only 37% ±4% in September 
2016 believed the two parties were sufficient. This is an enormous decrease from the 56% ±4% 
in 2003 who supported the two party formulation. A massive 57% ±4% in 2016 thought a third 
party was needed, compared to just 40% ±4% in 2003.  Such shifts in electoral views abet the 125
emergence of, and openness toward, socialism and Bernie Sanders—as it is clear the American 
public is receptive toward alternatives to either Republicans or Democrats.  
Historically, Americans avoided voting for third party candidates, practicing vote maximization 
due to fear of wasting a ballot on an unelectable candidate.  Indeed for all Americans affirm 126
support of third party presidential candidates in pre-election polls, there is a documented gap 
between those surveys and the actual number of votes outsiders received. Third party candidates, 
polling well in the summer prior to an election, always experience a substantial drop by 
November. This has been true for independents and third-party candidates of all ideological 
stripes, from Strom Thurmond in 1948, George Wallace in 1968, John Anderson in 1980, Ross 
Perot in both 1992 and 1996 and Ralph Nader in 2000.  Looking further back, to candidates 127
more akin to Sanders, such as Eugene Debs or Robert La Follette, is difficult due to a lack of pre-
election survey data. In the crowded four-way election of 1912, Socialist Party nominee Eugene 
Debs failed to carry a single state but amassed 6% of the total popular vote.  During the 1924 128
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race the progressive populist from Wisconsin, La Follete, won his home state and close to 5 
million votes and 17% nationally.   129
Cleverly, Sanders may have managed in 2016 to find the most feasible way to bridge 
Americans’ entrenched wariness of third party independents and the growing desire for political 
options outside the Republican or Democratic camps. Obviously, Bernie Sanders ran in the 
Democratic primary but in his entire previous political career he was officially an independent.  130
It was then possible for him to legitimately present himself as an outsider, to gain support from 
and tap into frustrations with the status quo, while suffering few of the challenges socialist third 
party candidates in the past faced. This also fits perfectly into Sanders presentation of himself as 
a reconstructive leader about to found a new era for America—which, while being incorrect for 
political time may have damaged his chances even as it addressed one systematic stumbling 
block.  
At the presidential level, socialists also suffered from the fact that most individuals directed 
economic ire and concern toward local and state, rather than federal, government.  Now, 131
however, the proliferation and reach of national labor laws means American workers more 
directly experience the effects of federal level action. Over 180 statutes cover everything from 
child labor to worker safety regulations and the minimum wage in twenty one states is 
determined by the federally mandated minimum wage.  Coupled with this are the economic 132
issues Americans consider top priorities—unemployment, poverty, taxes and the budget—which 
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are often addressed at the federal level.  It is pragmatic, in 21st century America, to focus 133
economic dissatisfaction toward the national government as it never was before, providing 
conditions far more amenable to a socialist presidential candidate campaigning on economic 
issues than when Eugene Debs was running in the 1910s.  
For all that the Bernie Sanders’ campaign was self consciously attempting to be revolutionary, 
and outside of the mainstream political process, it is clear that he was subject to the vagaries of 
momentum caused by voter familiarity with a candidate, wins and losses in primaries, and 
comparison to leading candidates of the other party. This demonstrates that the idea of socialism 
and a socialist candidate for president did not so immediately repel voters to the point of 
forestalling traditional electoral factors. For a substantial number of voters, calling himself a 
socialist and expressing a desire for Nordic style social democratic programs did not make 
Bernie Sanders automatically ineligible for office. While perhaps hasty to say socialism was a 
non-issue in the campaign, at the very least for many it did not disqualify Sanders from 
consideration as a serious candidate and a viable political option in 2016. Proof of this can be 
seen by looking at the timing of his primary wins and losses and the change in support and 
favorability ratings.  
There were an incredible number of opinion polls taken over the 15-month primary campaign 
and though several were conducted regularly throughout, the use of just one or two of these 
surveys has the potential to be misleading. Therefore, using the Huffington Post poll chart that 
aggregated over 350 opinion polls of who was favored to win the nomination, Hillary Clinton or 
Bernie Sanders, will show how his chances among voters varied over time. Name recognition 
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and familiarity are obvious early factors in Bernie Sanders’ campaign. After the official launch of 
his candidacy in May 2015 and the resulting news coverage his numbers doubled from around 
6% in March to 13% in early June.  Here a revulsion for socialism would have resulted in a 134
subsequent drop in support as his ideology and rhetoric became better known to voters. Yet 
Sanders’ climb in the polls is remarkably steady from this point on, even after he gave a much 
publicized speech at Georgetown University on November 19, 2015 detailing what it means to 
him to be a social democrat.   135
Momentum, which is essentially the snowballing of support for a candidate accumulating 
electoral victories, was also clearly at work for Sanders.  On February 4, 2016 Sanders had a 136
growing but still meagre 34% of Democratic voters supporting him, but after winning the New 
Hampshire primary—a victory that surprised few given the proximity to his home state of 
Vermont—support jumped to around 40% ten days later. He proceeded to perform well in the 
Nevada caucus, then on March 1 win the caucuses in Colorado and Minnesota and the primary in 
Oklahoma. Of the next six contests Sanders won three caucuses and the open primary in 
Michigan, and his numbers continued to increase.  Indeed, Sanders was within several hundred 137
pledged delegates of Hillary Clinton at this point and—despite the fact that her early 
superdelegate lead made it unlikely for him to capture the nomination—primary victories 
continued to drive his polling numbers upward.  On April 13 Sanders polled at 46% compared 138
to Clintons’ 49%. Yet a slowdown in momentum, caused by a decisive defeat in the New York 
primary, began a long and continued decline for Sanders in the polls. After further losses in April 
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and May, Sanders stood at 41% on the eve of his defeat in California, from which his position in 
the polls never recovered.  It is of note that these declines did not accompany a decline in 139
favorability ratings for Sanders, indicating lost support had more to do with lost primaries than 
distaste based on personal characteristics or the revelation of an unpopular policy stance.   140
While his viability as a candidate, that is the chance of becoming the party nominee, was 
falling, Sanders argued his electability as president against a Republican was greater than 
Clinton’s. It is true that a slightly larger number of polls indicated Sanders would beat 
Republican nominee Donald Trump in the general election by a larger margin than Hillary 
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Clinton.  Such polls do not account for the high level of scrutiny and attack both Trump and 141
Clinton faced as their party’s respective nominee; attention Bernie Sanders was at least partially 
shielded from.  Regardless of whether he would have been stronger than Clinton in a general 142
election, polls indicating that Sanders is an electable candidate at all are remarkable. They show 
that socialism is not a decisive blow against a national politician. The primary race against 
Clinton indicates standard electoral factors of name recognition, viability and momentum—not 
socialism—were decisive factors in Sanders’ loss. While this may seem disappointing to Sanders 
supporters, it strengthens the evidence that electoral features which proved particularly damaging 
to socialism have substantially diminished, or in the case of a third party candidacy, alternative 
solutions were formulated in 2016. Presentation of himself as a reconstructive politician, when 
this was out of sync with historical precedents and current political cycles, also hindered 
Sanders’ bid regardless of his association with socialism.  
ECONOMIC FACTORS  
The economic situation of Americans has not only direct bearing on views toward socialism 
but greatly influences the impact of other factors, such as changes to political cultural and 
electoral limitation. Strong arguments have been made that the high level of prosperity enjoyed 
by Americans drove large numbers of the working class to accept capitalism in exchange for its’ 
economic rewards.  For many, a secure, sufficient livelihood outweighed the potential risk of 143
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supporting socialism and challenging the system which provided relatively substantial benefits. 
An economic downturn and any number of economic woes—from falling wages, decreased 
security, less economic mobility and greater income inequality—would lessen the appeal of 
capitalism and make Americans more amenable to socialism in 2016.  
The economic wellbeing of the average American and the working class has sustained a 
number of damaging blows, including stagnating real wages, limited accumulation of wealth and 
low levels of economic mobility. Since the late 1970s inflation-adjusted real wages for the 
bottom 50th percentile of Americans has barely increased.  Even more wide ranging statistics 144
dating to 1964 show hourly wages went up less than two dollars when adjusted for inflation, 
meaning the purchasing power of workers has remained practically the same for fifty years.  145
Nor has the situation improved in recent years. Bureau of Labor statistics show the median 
weekly wage, adjusted for inflation, in 2014 was virtually identical to that of 2004.  Indeed, for 146
low income workers in the bottom 10th percentile, real hourly wages fell 5% from 1979.  147
Furthermore, three separate studies using three separate sets of data all indicate Americans are 
increasingly likely to experience sudden sharp declines in income, a sign of spreading financial 
precariousness.  While a decrease would obviously incite greater immediate ire among 148
Americans than mere stagnation, the persistent lack of growth steadily wears on the perception 
that capitalism is economically worthwhile despite any other objections with the system. 
Moreover, this stagnation does not reflect a general stagnation in the American economy but a 
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growing accumulation of wealth, wage increases, and income for a small number of rich 
Americans.  
It is undeniable that the distribution of income and wealth in the United States has grown 
increasingly unequal over the last several decades. As middle class wages lagged and low class 
wages fell, those with very high wages saw a 41% increase from 1979 levels.  Using the Gini 149
coefficient, calculated on disposable income, as a measure of the income distribution of the 
nation’s residents, income inequality increased 18% from 1979 to 2010. Even more striking is 
the wealth distribution; the top 10% have 80% of all the net worth in the country and the very 
highest 1% have 22%, a level not seen since the Great Depression. The bottom 90% of 
Americans share of the nation’s wealth has fallen since the mid-1980s, to pre–World War II 
levels. While this level of inequality is precedented in the United States, the steep accumulation 
of wealth at the top since 2000 is shocking given the previously outlined stagnation in wages 
experienced by the majority of Americans during the same period.  The level of mobility in 150
America is another component that potentially increased the disillusionment with capitalisms’ 
economic rewards and strengthens a case for socialism.  
There is considerable debate as to whether the level of economic mobility has decreased or 
stayed relatively steady over the last half century. Some studies demonstrate mobility remained 
about the same, or slightly better, from 1971 to 1993.  Others paint a picture of a declining 151
chances to move up and increased odds of falling down the economic ladder.  Regardless, even 152
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if the level of mobility has not declined, the data displays a distressingly low level of 
intergenerational class movement in the United States. Using the most generous calculations, a 
child in born in the 5th quintile has less than a 10% chance to move into the top 5th quintile and 
even an individual from the 4th quintile has below a 30% chance.  While not yet proven that 153
mobility is decreasing, a consistent, but poor chance, of advancement since the 1970s adds to the 
list of reasons average Americans have to feel that capitalism failed to fulfill the promise of 
financial wellbeing as it may once have.  
Indeed, polling demonstrates Americans are neither ignorant of nor pleased with these 
economic trends. Americans consistently stated wealth distribution is a problem in the country 
and a majority now think their own generation is better off economically than their children will 
be.  Yet in 2013 54% ±2.4% still believed capitalism worked at least somewhat well.  154 155
However, 52% ±2.4% of young people below the age of thirty-five in 2016 said they do not 
support capitalism, and only the barest majority of those thirty-five to sixty-four said they did.  156
Clearly the steadfast and unwavering belief in capitalism, and the allure of its economic rewards, 
has been rattled by the long term economic trends endured by average Americans. There has 
been an opening towards discussing the flaws of the system and perhaps exploring alternative 
approaches such as socialism and the policies espoused by Bernie Sanders. The opening was 
likely hastened by movements such as Occupy Wall Street and the Fight for $15, which focused 
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attention on economic problems that have been, according to the data above, affecting average 
Americans for decades. 
Two movements, the Occupy Wall Street protests and the strikes by fast food workers to raise 
the minimum to $15 an hour, emerged in 2011 and 2012. Following the physical occupation in 
September 2011 of Zuccotti Park in New York City by Occupy Wall Street (OWS) protesters, 
news coverage of income inequality skyrocketed. In the months prior the number of newspaper 
articles on income inequality was below 200. That count jumped to over 500 a month until 
bottoming out in March 2012. Even after the decline, media mentions of income inequality 
remained well above pre-OWS levels.  The issue saliency of income inequality rose 157
dramatically and continued action such as the Fight for $15 kept the financial situation of 
working class Americans relevant, even as the OWS Movement physically and organizationally 
dissipated. 
Started in November 2012 by fast food workers in New York City, the effort to raise the 
minimum wage to fifteen dollars an hour—later branded the Fight for $15—spread across the 
country.  Recent polls show there is considerable public support for increasing the minimum 158
wage, though not always to such a high level. While a June 2015 poll indicates that 71% ±3% 
want the minimum wage increased, only 38% ±3% would support $15 an hour for fast food 
workers.  Yet, even by April 2016, 59% ± 3.9% of respondent to a YouGov survey favored a 159
$12 wage and 48% ± 3.9% were amenable towards $15 an hour.  Both New York state and 160
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California passed legislation to raise the minimum wage, gradually over a period of several 
years, to $15 an hour.  Local city and county wide ordinances to make the minimum wage a 161
living wage, occasionally estimated to $12 or $13 according to the geographic region, have 
proliferated. In 2015 the National Employment Law Project reported fourteen cities or states 
passed such legislation and twenty-five states or localities approved minimum wage increases in 
2016. Fifty-one states and cities, more than ever before in United States history, have raised the 
minimum wage since 2012, evidence that raised awareness toward the issue can result in real 
political openings and momentum.   162
The economic situation and agitation leading up to the 2016 presidential primary led to an 
environment in which socialist ideals of equality and workers rights, and Bernie Sanders’ calls 
for redistributive programs and greater opportunity, had incredible resonance. His support for 
both the OWS protest and the $15 minimum wage tapped into the swell of economic discontent 
seen since the Great Recession.  It was also in line with his attempt at reconstructive politics, 163
that these were potential sources of a social movement which could aid his ascent into office and 
creation of a new regime. However, as discussed at length above, political time was partially 
incorrect for reconstruction because there was no massive, well-organized social movement 
formed during a period of growing disillusionment with conservatism. OWS and Fight for $15 
were either too narrowly issue focused, or too diffuse and incoherent, to provide the essential 
electoral and regime building assistance Sanders sought.  
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CONCLUSION  
Of the numerous factors considered above it is possible to identify several key trends and shifts 
that occurred to create an environment, in 2016, apt for socialism to emerge as a legitimate 
political possibility and the rise Bernie Sanders as a candidate for the Democratic presidential 
nomination. On an economic level, the lack of significant growth in wages or wealth for average 
Americans over the course of several decades, coupled with skyrocketing income and wealth 
inequality, paved the way for socialistic criticism of the system. Numbers of Americans grew to 
feel the level of opportunity was unsatisfactory for those willing to work hard to get ahead. This 
simmering dissatisfaction was then accelerated by movements which focused national attention 
on the financial plight of average Americans, strongly in line with Sanders’ message in 2016. 
Additionally, even as wariness toward government persists, an openness toward government 
programs, especially to expand equality of opportunity, increased. Electorally, Americans are 
now more than ever directing this desire for economic change toward national government, and 
display a mounting willingness to support third party and outsider candidates. Sanders also 
overcame a number of the persistent problems faced by socialists of the past by participating in 
the Democratic primary, instead of competing as an independent. As each component tended to 
reinforce and magnify the effects of the others, it is clear the simultaneous convergence of these 
factors in 2016 was crucial to the legitimization of Sanders and socialism.  
The persistence and continuance of several elements can also be observed as contributing to 
the ultimate failure of Bernie Sanders in the primary, and the remaining reticence of many 
Americans toward socialism. It is notable that a majority of Americans still do not directly 
approve of socialism, even as it grows in popularity among young people and the allure of 
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capitalism fades. Moreover, unity within the working and lower class remains elusive as deep 
racial tension and resentment persists in modern America. The misalignment between political 
time, and the structure of presidential authority that Sanders pursued, is key to understanding the 
limits of Sanders’ and socialisms success. Regardless of the socialist tinge his reconstruction 
carried, the moment in 2016 was deeply wrong for Democratic regime building and that 
disadvantaged Sanders’ candidacy profoundly. Socialism itself is much less at fault for Sanders’ 
failure to capture the Democratic nomination than was a misreading of which leadership style 
was most appropriate for, and desired by, Democratic voters in that moment. While socialism 
was a component to his success—in allowing him to tap into and offer more radical solutions to 
the economic discontent, and desire for outsider political candidates felt by numerous Americans
—it is conceivable that this could have been accomplished regardless of whether Sanders called 
himself a democratic socialist or not.  
What Donald Trump’s victory in the general election, and a Republican presidency, mean for 
the future chances of a socialist candidate is uncertain. Any opportunity for a leftwing resurgence 
may be over—racial divisions may deepen, an ossified Democratic party may fail to address 
desire for alternative political candidates, and a progressive movement could be starved of 
necessary energy by either disillusionment or improved economic conditions. On the other hand, 
a Trump presidency may set the stage for true regime reconstruction in 2020, by a socialist or 
similarly radical Democratic candidate.  
Donald Trump’s presidency could result in a national crisis of confidence in the conservative 
regime—as its principles and commitment become increasingly unable to meet the challenges 
facing the nation and satisfy the desires of the American people. Either a singular catastrophic 
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event, be it a natural disaster or diplomatic emergency, or the protracted inability to accomplish a 
key goal, such as effectively repealing the Affordable Care Act, would precipitate and clarify 
delegitimization. A truly mass movement of discontented individuals could grow from this 
period of disjunction. Chances for a reconstructive president are stronger should this movement 
gain enough political force within a year or two to swing the political pendulum in the 2018 
midterms against conservative politicians. The traditional coalition of both parties may break 
apart and realign in significant ways. Growing divisions within the Republican Party, especially 
between the executive and Congress, over the next year and in the midterm elections—perhaps 
even resulting in an internecine fight over the 2020 presidential nominee—would bode well for a 
reconstructive Democratic espousing socialist ideals. Political time would then be correct in 
2020 or 2024 in a way it is was not in 2016. Conversely, success advancing key conservative 
priorities and programs paramount to Trump’s supporters; from jobs in the Rust belt and 
infrastructure spending, to strident action against immigration and access to abortion, would 
boost the conservative regime. Trump would be cemented as an articulative president and the 
feasibility or victory of a socialist candidate in 2020 would grow increasingly dim with each year 
and conservative accomplishment. Bernie Sanders 2016 campaign would be shown to have been 
a momentary anomaly, an interesting but largely insignificant socialist curiosity, lost within the 
larger conservative political milieu of the United States.  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